Proposals on information support to the Republic of Georgia

This letter was issued by a Russian nationalist organization Northern Brotherhood, which shares common interests with the Republic of Georgia, regarding a possible attempt to resolve the Abkhaz crisis by force. We are talking about a possibility of turning the cold war between two Caucasus regions into its hot phase, the second Abkhaz War.

Here is how we find a common ground with the Republic of Georgia.

If Georgia would implement a law enforcement to regain its full control over Abkhazia, our organization is interested in Georgia to succeed. There are few reasons for that:

 1. We are in an uncompromising opposition to the current political regime in the Russian Federation (RF). Any political failure of this regime, including its foreign policy, paves a road to our success.

2. We are interested in, or rather to say, we consider it as one of our major political objectives, a divorce of Russia and the Caucasus to happen. We mean the divorce with North Caucasian regions of the RF. Therefore, any tightening the ties of Abkhazia or South Ossetia with Russia contradicts our concept in principle. We are willing to give up on all North Caucasian autonomies of Russia (except number of Russian regions in the area) in favor of whoever, including Georgia. Take them if you like them. Our only wish is to get rid of them.

3. We are strictly against another victory of Abkhazia over Georgia, as this would be, above all, another victory for the CNC (the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus), the so-called "Confederates". Since such victory would improve morale, national identity and cohesion of Peoples of the Caucasus Mountains in their confrontation to Russians on the Russian land. We are interested in the defeat of the CNC (altogether with Abkhazia) in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, with maximum personal losses of the CNC in such a combat.

4. We are very interested in fuelling the tensions between North Caucasus Mountain Peoples (CNC) and the RF regime.

5. We are strictly against any involvement of Russian volunteers in Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. In the first Georgian-Abkhazian war, that participation played extremely significant role. We need such passionate Russians for another business in Russia.

As you can see, in that possible military Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation, we maintain common interests with Georgia.

What could we propose to Georgia in terms of possible co-operation and what would we expect in return?

To begin with, that is what we can offer -

We can organize an information campaign in the Russian mass media (Internet cyberspace and Press) in the following directions:

1) A campaign against a participation of Russian volunteers in the conflict with Abkhazia, taking the side of Abkhazia; actions to discredit Abkhazia with a heating up of anti-Abkhaz sentiments in the mainstream of anti-Caucasians (primarily anti-North-Caucasians, the CNC) moods amongst Russians;
2) A campaign against any logistic, diplomatic and military support from RF to Abkhazia in the upcoming hot phase of the conflict.

Both directions of the information campaign would be fully consistent with our interests as indicated above, and with the interests of Georgia, which wants to successfully conclude the long-term standoff with Abkhazia.

To organize this campaign we have the intellectual and human resources, the necessary connections in the media and journalists world, as well as extremely high level of ideological and political motivation.

To implement this campaign we would need a financial support from Georgia. And we would agree with a spending control by the Georgian representatives.

We would like to note that the information campaign in the direction (1), concerning the prevention of participation of Russian volunteers in the Georgian-Abkhazian military conflict on the side of Abkhazia, will be conducted by us in any case. First of all, it will take place in the Russian national patriotic circles and in the media under their control. And a flow of Russian volunteers to Abkhazia, unlike the situation with the first Georgian-Abkhazian war, will be clearly neutralized by us, regardless of the third party assistance.

But effective work in the direction (2), concerning the freezing of logistic, diplomatic and military help of the RF to Abkhazia, without the appropriate level of funding will not be effective. We do not have resources for the second campaign.

Blocking of such help to Abkhazia from the RF is the key to the success of Georgia in the alleged conflict. Without this assistance blocked, the success of Georgia in this war becomes very problematic. And in any case, Georgia would pay quite a different price.
We are fully aware that a key role in blocking the RF support to Abkhazia will be played not by a public opinion in Russia and not by the information campaign we assumed. The main factor will be a position of the U.S. and the West, and the certain degree extent of their will and consistent pressure to the RF's government on the subject. However, their will and perseverance might be enough or not enough. And in this case, our information campaign and developed under its influence public opinion could become the last drop which made the cup run over. Not even a drop, but rather a solid stone, which would turn the scale at once as we need it.

Certainly, the Republic of Georgia could implement such information campaign alone. Either it could hire a team of political technologists in the RF.  But we have a significant competitive advantage, which so called “professional political technologists” don’t and can’t have.

This is, above all, the high level of ideological and political motivations.

Our motivation and interest in the success of the campaign by the above mentioned political and ideological reasons guarantee that funds won’t be trivially stolen or inappropriately spent. It ensures that money would work the most efficient way against our mutual opponents.

We hope that you are interested in our offer. We are waiting for a response.
The letter was copied to the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Public Security and Government of Georgia.